THE AUTHOR:
Soraya Corm-Bakhos, FCIArb, Independent Arbitrator and Founder of Corm-Bakhos Arbitration
In 2025, UAE onshore and offshore courts delivered landmark arbitration rulings. Key developments include confirmation of tribunals’ power to issue anti suit injunctions, clarification of award signature requirements, and refined approaches by the DIFC and ADGM Courts to interim relief, strengthening the UAE’s pro arbitration framework.
Introduction
Recently, UAE Courts, both onshore and offshore issued several landmark arbitration-related rulings. These decisions clarify key aspects of tribunal powers, interim relief, and formal requirements for awards.
Notably, the Dubai Court of Cassation confirmed arbitral tribunals’ authority to grant anti-suit injunctions. The Federal and Local Judicial Principles Unification Authority addressed long-standing formalism by confirming that awards need only be signed on the final page. Meanwhile, the DIFC Courts (Dubai International Financial Centre Courts) and ADGM (Abu Dhabi Global Market) Courts further refined the scope of court-ordered interim relief in support of arbitration.
Dubai Court of Cassation confirms arbitral tribunal’s authority to issue anti-suit injunctions under the Federal Arbitration Law (“FAL”)
On 3 July 2025, the Dubai Court of Cassation issued a significant ruling in Commercial Appeal No. 657/2025. Reversing an earlier Court of Appeal decision (Case No. 8/2025, 28 April 2025), the Court of Cassation held that a tribunal in a UAE‑seated arbitration may issue an interim anti‑suit injunction, and that only the tribunal may vary or revoke that order while the arbitration is on foot. The Court grounded its reasoning in Article 21 of the FAL, emphasizing that interim and precautionary measures encompass orders restraining conduct that threatens the arbitral process.
The shift is significant because the April 2025 Court of Appeal decision had cancelled the anti-suit injunction finding that the measure was a violation of the constitutional right to access the courts. The Court of Appeal framed access to the courts as a constitutional right incapable of being curtailed absent an express statutory mandate. The Court of Cassation reasoned differently and ruled that a time‑limited, procedural restraint designed to protect the arbitration such as an anti-suit injunction does not undermine access to justice; it regulates forum conduct pending the final award. Applying Article 21 of the FAL, the Court of Cassation held that an arbitral tribunal is empowered to “order any interim or precautionary measures it deems necessary as required by the nature of the dispute”. The Court also found that the FAL gives the arbitral tribunal exclusive power to “cancel, suspend, or amend any interim measure it has ordered” and that the law “did not give the right to cancel these interim and precautionary measure to any entity other than the arbitral tribunal itself”. The Court concluded that the Court of Appeal did not have jurisdiction to hear the challenge in the first place and that the application should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.
Therefore, where the seat is in the UAE, tribunals may, where appropriate, consider the deployment of anti-suit injunctions (or tailored status quo orders) under Article 21(1)(e) of the FAL to prevent parallel court actions that would prejudice the arbitration. Applications to local courts to annul those interim measures during proceedings should now be dismissed.
Dubai International Finance Centre (“DIFC”) Court Discharges Anti-Suit Injunction for Lack of Jurisdiction
The DIFC Courts continued to refine the boundaries of their injunctive jurisdiction in support of arbitration. In the case of (1) Oran (2) Oaken v Oved [CA 004/2025], the underlying dispute arose from a contract which included a legacy DIFC-LCIA (Arbitration Centre of the Dubai International Financial Centre-London Court of International Arbitration (Inactive)) arbitration clause referencing “Dubai, UAE” as the seat of arbitration. The Claimant (appellants) commenced proceedings in the English High Court while the defendant, a UK limited company – with no assets or nexus to the DIFC – had filed a DIAC arbitration and sought an anti-suit injunction from the DIFC Courts to restrain the English proceedings. At first instance, the DIFC Court granted the anti-suit injunction finding that the case presented unusual and exceptional circumstances justifying the exercise of its jurisdiction. The key issue on appeal was whether the DIFC Court had jurisdiction to grant the anti-suit injunction where the DIFC was not the seat of the arbitration and no other nexus to the DIFC existed. The DIFC Court of Appeal (“DIFC CA”) allowed the appeal and discharged the anti-suit injunction.
It is worth noting that the DIFC CA distinguished between its jurisdiction to issue freezing injunctions and its jurisdiction to issue anti-suit injunctions based on arbitration agreements. In relation to the former, the DIFC CA noted that “the relevant jurisdiction is the Court’s jurisdiction to enforce prospective awards or judgments, foreign or domestic, and the injunctive power can be exercised to protect the exercise of that jurisdiction by preventing the dissipation of assets before the jurisdiction can be invoked” (para. 62). Yet, regarding its jurisdiction to issue anti-suit injunctions, the DIFC CA held that “unless the case otherwise falls within a head of jurisdiction specifically identified in the Court Law (because, for example, one of the parties is a DIFC establishment), the only source of jurisdiction is the DIFC Arbitration Law. However, the supervisory jurisdiction conferred upon the Court to protect arbitrations by the Arbitration Law by, for example, issuing anti-suit injunctions, is limited to arbitrations seated in the DIFC” (para. 63). Therefore, unlike its jurisdiction to grant freezing order, the DIFC CA found no freestanding jurisdiction to grant an anti-suit injunction where the DIFC is not the seat of the arbitration and no other nexus to the DIFC exits. This is a limitation on the Courts’ injunctive powers beyond asset-preservation measures.
Interim Relief Before the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM)
The ADGM Court rendered a noteworthy decision in relation to interim relief confirming that it may order urgent interim relief even if that would be contrary to the applicable institutional arbitration rules.
In A30 & Ors v E30 & Others [2025] ADGMCA 0003, the ADGM Court of Appeal (“ADGM CA”) held that the mandatory provisions of the ADGM Arbitration Regulations 2015 permit applications to the ADGM Court for interim measures—including a worldwide freezing order—even if the LCIA Rules would require prior tribunal permission before applying for court-ordered interim measures (Article 25.3, LCIA Rules). At first instance, the Court refused the application holding that the parties were bound by their agreement to arbitrate under the LCIA Rules. The applicant had not sought consent from the arbitral tribunal before applying to the court for interim relief. The ADGM CA took a different view. It relied upon section 31 of the ADGM Arbitration Regulations 2015, which grants the ADGM Court the power to order interim measures before or during arbitration. Importantly, the CA noted that section 31 is expressly listed as a mandatory provision and has effect “notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary” (para 17). The ADGM CA also noted that it intervened because the tribunal could not act effectively being unable to grant interim measures on a without-notice basis.
This decision helpfully confirms that interim relief may be granted by the ADGM Court where there is genuine urgency and the tribunal is unable to act effectively for example where a freezing order is sought on an urgent basis to prevent dissipation of assets.
Federal and Local Judicial Principles Unification Authority Clarifies Signature Requirements for Arbitration Awards
The long‑running debate over whether arbitrators must sign every page of an award is finally over. On 4 August 2025, the Federal and Local Judicial Principles Unification Authority (Authority) (Decision No. 1/2025) held that awards issued in the UAE need only be signed on the final page; there is no requirement to sign each page or both the reasoning and dispositive sections. The decision resolves conflicting lines of authority (including DCC 403/2020 and DCC 109/2022) and is binding on all UAE Courts (federal and local). The Authority also stressed that imposing such a condition on foreign awards cannot be treated as a public policy matter. Neither the FAL nor the New York Convention (1958) requires it.
This clarification addresses prior uncertainty and aligns the treatment of arbitral awards with prevailing international practice. This is a welcome improvement from the strict formalism which the UAE Courts previously imposed by refusing to enforce awards (including foreign awards) if only the last page bore signatures. The new unified rule should meaningfully reduce opportunistic annulment tactics and the practice of marathon page‑signing sessions by tribunals.
Conclusion
Those decisions confirm the UAE Courts continued pro-arbitration stance and their alignment with international best practice. In particular, they demonstrate increasing judicial support for tribunal authority, a pragmatic approach to procedural formalities, and a clear framework for court intervention in support of arbitration. Together they reinforce the UAE’s position as a leading regional arbitration hub.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Soraya Corm-Bakhos, is a Fellow of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. She is an independent arbitrator, founder of Corm-Bakhos Arbitration. She can be contacted on [email protected].
*The views and opinions expressed by authors are theirs and do not necessarily reflect those of their organizations, employers, or Daily Jus, Jus Mundi, or Jus Connect.
