THE AUTHOR:
Rinat Gareev, Legal Counsel at Whitecliff Management
The arbitration in Wintershall Dea GmbH v. Russian Federation (II) (PCA Case No. 2024-42) has moved beyond the merits of expropriation and into a struggle over judicial power. In November 2025, the Dubai International Financial Centre Courts (“DIFC“) in the United Arab Emirates intervened in support of the tribunal, issuing a penal notice that warned Russia and those assisting it of contempt consequences, potentially extending to criminal liability. The move triggered an immediate reaction by the Arbitrazh Court of the City of Moscow in Russia, which continued its own proceedings and applied monetary sanctions. This case shows, in practical terms, the enforcement challenges that characterize the post-Lugovoy landscape.
Since Russia enacted the so-called Lugovoy Law in 2020, Arbitrazh (commercial) courts in Russia have aggressively asserted domestic jurisdiction over disputes involving Russian parties. The law grants Russian courts exclusive authority where a Russian litigant faces “unfriendly” foreign proceedings, effectively authorizing them to override foreign arbitration dispute resolution clauses. Under this framework, domestic courts have repeatedly enjoined foreign arbitrations and even fined foreign claimants for proceeding abroad. The Wintershall Dea GmbH v. Russian Federation (II) case is an Energy Charter Treaty arbitration seated in the Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC), which has now escalated this tug‐of‐war into an outright jurisdictional clash between DIFC courts and Arbitrazh courts in Russia.
Case Background and Timeline
Wintershall Dea (a German energy company) challenged Russia’s 2023 decrees on oil and gas (citing expropriation of its interests) under the ECT and a Germany – Russia BIT (1989). Russia’s Prosecutor General reacted by suing in Moscow (Case No. A40‑92702/2025), seeking to bar the PCA arbitration. In April 2025, the Moscow Arbitrazh court granted interim relief by suspending all arbitration proceedings on the grounds that the appointed arbitrators (from “unfriendly” Switzerland, France and the UK) were allegedly biased. By September 2025 courts in Russia had issued final anti‑arbitration injunctions, permanently forbidding Wintershall, its counsel, and the arbitral tribunal from continuing the foreign arbitration. For flouting that order the court imposed draconian penalties of 7.5 billion euro fines on each of Wintershall, its lawyers and the arbitrators. When Wintershall ignored the injunctions, the Russian court formally ordered enforcement of those fines.
Meanwhile, the arbitral tribunal issued successive anti‑anti‑suit injunctions (AASIs), ordering Russia to halt its domestic proceedings as materially prejudicial to the arbitration. Wintershall then sought DIFC‐court assistance in the arbitration’s seat to enforce these anti‑anti‑suit orders.
DIFC Court’s Intervention and Penal Notice
On 19 November 2025, H.E. Justice Sir Jeremy Cooke of the DIFC Court of First Instance sat in on an urgent hearing. The judge recognized and enforced the tribunal’s AASI against Russia, and issued an interim order. The DIFC Court expressly prohibited the Russian Federation (and its agencies) from proceeding with the Moscow enforcement hearing or taking any steps to enforce its prior injunction and fines. In his order, Judge Cooke attached a stark penal notice: a formal warning that if Russia (or anyone aiding it) disobeyed the DIFC order, it could face contempt of court with fines, imprisonment, and asset seizures. In the tribunal’s own quoted words:
“IF YOU, THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION, DISOBEY THE ORDER YOU MAY BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT OF COURT AND MAY BE FINED OR REFERRED TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF DUBAI… ANY OTHER PERSON WHO KNOWS OF THIS ORDER AND DOES ANYTHING WHICH HELPS OR PERMITS RUSSIA TO BREACH… MAY ALSO BE HELD TO BE IN CONTEMPT… IMPRISONED, FINED OR HAVE THEIR ASSETS SEIZED.”
Borrowed from English procedural practice, the penal notice stands out for its unusual degree of formality and severity of tone. In practice, a sovereign state’s immunity means those measures cannot be directly executed against Russia, but any private advisors or lawyers involved would face real personal risk of fines or jail if held in contempt.
Moscow’s Response: Fines and Sovereignty
The DIFC order was met with an immediate and firm reaction from the court in Russia. The Arbitrazh Court of Moscow responded on two fronts. On 20 November, it granted the Prosecutor’s application to enforce the approximately €7.5 billion in penalties previously levied against Wintershall, its counsel, and the arbitrators, notwithstanding the contemporaneous warnings issued by the DIFC court. Later that month, the court went further, declining to recognize the DIFC order altogether. Relying on principles of state sovereignty and references to the UN Charter, it concluded that the foreign injunction constituted an impermissible interference with Russia’s domestic judicial authority. In its words, the DIFC order “required Russia, as a sovereign state, to abandon the defense of its public interests” and constituted impermissible interference with Russia’s judicial system. The court referred to principles of state sovereignty reflected in international law, maintaining that foreign judicial acts could not bind the Russian Federation in the exercise of its public authority.
In essence, two courts have issued directly opposing mandates. The DIFC court, acting in support of the arbitration, ordered Russia to refrain from pursuing its domestic measures, while the Moscow court, invoking the Lugovoy framework and principles of sovereignty, proceeded with the imposition and enforcement of penalties.
As a practical matter, execution of the DIFC order against the Russian Federation appears unattainable. State immunity shields Russia from coercive consequences in Dubai, whereas the Russian court has made plain that it regards the DIFC intervention as devoid of legal effect and intends to pursue enforcement within its own jurisdiction.
Implications
This escalation in the Wintershall saga highlights the extreme jurisdictional uncertainty in sanctions‑era arbitrations. Key lessons include:
- Clash of Jurisdictions. The Lugovoy Law drove the initial cascade of Russian anti‑arbitration injunctions. But because the arbitration was seated in Dubai, the DIFC Court (sitting in common law) has now asserted itself to protect the tribunal’s orders. This rare conflict demonstrates that even arbitration‑friendly seats like DIFC will defend awards or tribunal orders, potentially against a party (investor)’s own home state.
- Scope of Penal Notices. DIFC penal notices are typically addressed to companies or individuals, not sovereign states. In this case, DIFC’s judge effectively told the Russian state it could face contempt sanctions. While those sanctions likely cannot bite the Russian Federation itself, the notice clearly puts individual counsel, arbitrators and experts at risk. Legal commentators observe that the document is declarative but it sets the stage for contempt proceedings if the order is violated.
- Enforcement Limits. Russia’s heavy fines underscore that Lugovoy Law still drives Moscow’s courts to punish “foreign” proceedings. Yet the showdown also shows the limits of such tactics: as the Russian court conceded, states generally enjoy immunity from foreign anti‑suit orders. Any DIFC‑mandated fines or asset seizures against Russia would be blocked by sovereign immunity. By contrast, private parties (Wintershall’s lawyers and the arbitral tribunal members) lack such immunity and could arguably be pursued, though it is politically fraught.
- Practical Significance. In the end, the substantive arbitration outcome remains uncertain. Wintershall’s claims continue at the PCA, and the Moscow court is enforcing its own agenda. Moscow’s €7.5 bn penalty is unprecedented, but actual recovery from Wintershall may be limited by its de minimis assets in Russia. Likewise, DIFC’s penal notice may never translate into actual sanctions. Still, the exchange amplifies risks for foreign investors: arbitrators, counsel or financiers could be caught between conflicting orders.
In sum, Wintershall Dea (II) case is turning into a test case of how far arbitration seats and domestic courts will push their authority. The DIFC’s assertive penal notice is a first against a state and Moscow’s stiff reaction both push the limits of international arbitration practice. For now, the parties are left in a legal stalemate: Russia will continue to enforce its own judgments at home, while Wintershall will press ahead abroad under the DIFC’s protection. The incident underscores that even “arbitration‑friendly” venues cannot fully insulate disputes from geopolitical and sovereign countermeasures in today’s sanctions climate.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Rinat Gareev is a dual-qualified U.S. attorney and English solicitor who advises clients on the full spectrum of corporate and cross-border matters. At Whitecliff Management, based in the firm’s Dubai office, Rinat’s practice encompasses the structuring and negotiation of mergers and acquisitions, joint ventures, and the management of multi-jurisdictional disputes.
*The views and opinions expressed by authors are theirs and do not necessarily reflect those of their organizations, employers, or Daily Jus, Jus Mundi, or Jus Connect.
