THE AUTHOR:
Kimberley Pardailhé-Galabrun, Managing Associate at Linklaters
Bernardo Kahn, International Arbitration Intern at Linklaters
Ensuring an appeal against an arbitral award is lodged in time is critical. As made clear by two recent English court cases, the consequences for missing the deadline to appeal can be stark:
- In Friedhelm Eronat v CNPC International (Chad) Ltd [2025] EWCA Civ 1054 (“Eronat v CNPC”), the Court of Appeal refused to grant permission to appeal the award.
- In JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade DMCC [2025] EWHC 2713 (Comm) (“JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade”), the High Court decided the appeal had been made out of time, and refused to grant an extension of time for bringing the appeal, striking out the claim.
In Eronat v CNPC, the deadline for appeal had been expressly agreed in the contract. In JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade, the deadline for appeal was set out in s.70(3) of the English Arbitration Act 1996 (“Arbitration Act”). We consider each case in turn.
Eronat v CNPC
In Eronat v CNPC, CNPC had brought a claim in LCIA (London Court of International Arbitration) arbitration against Eronat under a deed of indemnity. The deed gave parties the right to appeal an arbitral decision “provided that such appeal is brought within thirty (30) days after the decision is rendered” (emphasis added). In this case, the parties’ agreement concerned an appeal under s.69 Arbitration Act (in relation to which parties can modify by agreement the default statutory time limits under the Arbitration Act).
The tribunal found in favour of CNPC (the “Award”). The Award was dated 11 April 2024 but was only sent to the parties by the LCIA Secretariat on 16 April 2024.
Eronat sought to appeal the Award on 16 May 2024, i.e., 35 days from the date of the Award, or 30 days from the date Eronat received the Award from the LCIA Secretariat. The key question considered by the Court of Appeal was whether, under the deed, the date the “decision is rendered” (and so the date from which the time for appeal started to run) was:
- The date of delivery by the LCIA Secretariat, in which case the appeal was in time; or
- The date of the Award, in which case the appeal was 5 days too late.
The Court of Appeal decided that the date the decision was “rendered” was the date of the Award, such that the appeal was out of time, and refused permission to appeal. They noted that the word “rendered” in isolation could mean either the date of delivery or the date of award. However, when the language of the clause was considered in its context and taking account of the background information available to the parties, it was clear that it referred to the date of award:
- The deed referred elsewhere to the tribunal “render[ing] its decision in English” which could only refer to the making of the award; and
- The LCIA and ICC rules, which were current at the time of the deed, spoke of the arbitral tribunal rendering its award in terms which could only refer to the making of the award.
The Court of Appeal acknowledged that there is inevitably some delay between the making of the award and its transmission to the tribunal, given that the LCIA Secretariat will only transmit the award if the costs of the arbitration have been paid. However, there was:
“Nothing unfair or unreasonable in the parties having agreed a right of appeal which was subject to a time limit which might start running before they were aware of the terms of the award.”
Further, to interpret the clause as referring to the making of the award accorded with the general scheme of the Arbitration Act, which draws a distinction between the making of the award and its notification to the parties.
This statutory scheme was considered in JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade, to which we now turn.
JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade
The JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade case concerned a contract concluded for the sale of crude sunflower oil, which was subject to the FOFSA Arbitration Rules 2020.
A dispute arose, and a FOFSA first-tier tribunal issued an award in favour of Aves Trade (“FTT Award”), which JSC appealed. The FOFSA Board of Appeal issued an award on 26 March 2025 (“Appeal Award“) and notified the parties that the Appeal Award would be made available upon payment of an outstanding balance. JSC, a Russian entity, encountered difficulties in paying for the Appeal Award because of sanctions. Ultimately, payment was made by an intermediary in the UAE, and the Appeal Award was received by JSC on 10 April 2025.
JSC sought to appeal on a point of law under s.69 Arbitration Act on 8 May 2025. This was 43 days after the date of the Appeal Award and precisely 28 days after the date when it received the Appeal Award.
The facts of the case arose before the amendments to the Arbitration Act introduced by the Arbitration Act 2025 came into effect. Prior to these, s.70(3) Arbitration Act provided that any application or appeal under s.67, 68 or 69 Arbitration Act:
“Must be brought within 28 days of the date of the award or, if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review, of the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process”.
The central issue in this case was, therefore, whether that 28-day period ran from:
- The date of the Appeal Award, per the first limb of s.70(3) – in which case the appeal was out of time; or
- The date when JSC received the Appeal Award, per the second limb of s.70(3) – in which case the appeal was in time.
Bright J considered observations made in UR Power GmbH v Kuok Oils and Grains Pte Ltd [2009] EWHC 1940 (Comm) (UR Power GmbH) and in PEC Ltd v Asia Golden Rice Co Ltd [2012] EWHC 846 (Comm) (PEC Ltd). Both cases considered whether the second limb of s.70(3), “any arbitral process of appeal or review”, had been engaged.
- In UR Power GmbH, Gross J determined that this second limb did not apply to appeals within well-known two-tier arbitration schemes such as FOFSA (Federation of Oils, Seeds and Fats Associations) or GAFTA (Grain and Feed Trade Association), such that the time for appeal ran from the date of the appeal award itself under the first limb of s.70(3).
- PEC Ltd related to a GAFTA arbitration in which PEC had claimed that GAFTA had no jurisdiction. The first-tier tribunal rejected the argument and awarded damages against PEC. Under the GAFTA Arbitration Rules, there could be no appeal to the GAFTA appeal board against a ruling on jurisdiction. PEC therefore appealed the award on damages to the GAFTA appeal board and, in parallel, commenced proceedings under s.67 Arbitration Act, disputing the first-tier tribunal’s ruling on jurisdiction. The s.67 challenge was lodged 36 days after the first-tier tribunal’s award. Hamblen J held that the only way in which the question of jurisdiction could be challenged was through s.67 and therefore, so far as jurisdiction was concerned, there was no “available arbitral process of appeal or review” such that the time from appeal ran from the date of the first-tier tribunal’s award. The appeal was made out of time.
With these cases in mind, Bright J determined that the s.69 appeal related to the Appeal Award itself and there was no available arbitral process of appeal or review of that award, which could only be challenged by an Arbitration Act claim. Therefore, only the first limb of s.70(3) was relevant, and the time began to run from 26 March 2025. The claim form had not been issued in time.
Bright J also refused to grant an extension of time, thereby striking out the claim. He considered that, at 15 days, the length of delay was “not enormous” but “at over 50% of the entire time allowed…nor [was] it trifling“. The critical factor in this case was “whether the Claimant acted reasonably in permitting the permitted period of 28 days to expire” – on the facts, he concluded that they had not.
Arbitration Act 2025
In JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trades, the facts of the case arose before the effective date of reforms introduced by the Arbitration Act 2025. However, the Arbitration Act 1996, as amended by the Arbitration Act 2025, still retains the first and second limb of s.70(3) at new ss. 70(3A) (a) and (d). The position therefore remains that, “if there has been any arbitral process of appeal or review”, then time for appeal runs from “the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of the result of that process”.
Following JSC Kazan Oil Plant v Aves Trade, the conclusion seems to be that the existence of such a process does not engage the time limit which runs from the notification of the result. The answer seems to be in whether it results in an award or not (i.e., as in PEC Ltd, Hamblen J suggested that a “possible answer” could be to construe the wording “as applying in cases in which the appeal or review does not culminate in an award”). Following this approach, the notification time limit is principally for cases where the arbitral appeal/review process does not culminate in a new (or altered/corrected award, e.g., an original award is upheld.
It could be said that this distinction is consistent with the new ss. 70(3A) (b) and (c) of the amended Arbitration Act 1996, which draw a similar distinction in relation to corrections under s.57 Arbitration Act:
- Where a tribunal has, under s.57, made a material correction to an award or has made a material additional award, then the time for appeal will run from the date of the correction or additional award; but
- Where the tribunal has decided not to grant an application under s.57, then the time for appeal runs from the date when the applicant or appellant was notified of that decision.
And commentary has at least alluded to some parallels (see e.g. Merkin’s Arbitration Law (July 2025) at 9.12, commenting on Hamblen J’s judgment in PEC Ltd). On the other hand, it is not necessarily a conclusion which immediately springs from how s.70(3A) is worded, particularly when set against the methodical manner in which ss.70(3A) (b) and (c) now tease out a similar point.
Final Thoughts
Both cases illustrate the English Court’s approach to determining whether an appeal has been lodged in time and the stark consequences of getting it wrong. They underscore the need for careful and cautious consideration to determining and meeting the appeal deadline, whether it is statutory or is a permitted contractual agreement on timing.
ABOUT THE AUTHORS
Kimberley Pardailhé-Galabrun is a managing associate in Linklaters’ international arbitration practice in London. She has acted on a wide range of multi-jurisdictional disputes under major institutional rules, with a particular focus on the energy, infrastructure, commodities, and construction sectors. Kimberley is admitted as a Solicitor of the Senior Courts of England & Wales.
Bernardo Kahn is an International Arbitration Intern at Linklaters‘ international arbitration practice in London. Previously, he interned at Three Crowns LLP in London and was an Associate at the Litigation & Arbitration practice at Vieira de Almeida & Associados (VdA) in Lisbon, Portugal. He has acted in several international commercial and investment arbitrations with a particular focus on energy, financial services, and hospitality sectors. Bernardo is admitted as an Advogado at the Portuguese Bar Association and is studying to qualify as a Solicitor of the Senior Courts of England & Wales.
*The views and opinions expressed by authors are theirs and do not necessarily reflect those of their organizations, employers, or Daily Jus, Jus Mundi, or Jus Connect.
