THE AUTHOR:
Tekla Giguashvili, LL.M. Candidate in International Commercial Arbitration Law at Stockholm University
Can a most-favoured-nation (“MFN”) clause enable an investor to access an arbitral forum that is not expressly available under the investment treaty governing the investment? On 26 June 2026, the Swedish Supreme Court addressed this question in Z.O. v. Georgia (Case No. T 9380-24), holding that the MFN clause in the 1995 United Kingdom–Georgia Bilateral Investment Treaty (“UK–Georgia BIT”) could permit recourse to arbitration under a separate treaty offering a broader choice of arbitral forums.
The decision is significant for investment arbitration as it addresses the relationship between MFN treatment, treaty interpretation and state consent to arbitration. The Court did not establish that MFN clauses invariably extend to dispute settlement. Rather, it emphasised the importance of the particular treaty wording, the comparative advantages of the alternative dispute settlement mechanism and compliance with its procedural requirements.
The Swedish Supreme Court’s judgment of 26 June 2026 therefore offers an important contribution to the continuing debate over whether an MFN clause can provide access to an alternative arbitral forum.
The Jurisdictional Dilemma – When Treaty Protection Meets Institutional Limits
The dispute arose from investments in Georgia by Zaza Okuashvili, a dual British-Georgian national who alleged that Georgia had breached its obligations under the UK-Georgia BIT. The immediate obstacle was jurisdictional rather than substantive: the investor sought to pursue his claim through arbitration administered by the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), although the UK-Georgia BIT expressly provides for ICSID arbitration.
The difficulty arose from Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention, which excludes a natural person who holds the nationality of the respondent state from qualifying as a national of another Contracting State for the purposes of the Convention. Okuashvili’s Georgian nationality therefore prevented him from accessing ICSID arbitration against Georgia in the circumstances of the case.
To overcome this obstacle, the investor relied on the MFN clause in the UK-Georgia BIT in conjunction with Article 10 of the Georgia–Belgium-Luxembourg Economic Union (“BLEU”) BIT. The latter treaty offers a choice of dispute settlement mechanisms, including SCC arbitration.
Georgia contested the tribunal’s jurisdiction, and in November 2024 the Svea Court of Appeal set aside the jurisdictional award. The Swedish Supreme Court subsequently overturned that decision, recognising that the relevant treaty provisions could provide a basis for SCC arbitration, while remitting the case for further consideration of the applicable procedural requirements.
The dispute thus exposed a fundamental tension in investment treaty interpretation: should an express designation of an arbitral institution be treated as a closed jurisdictional arrangement, or can a broadly worded MFN clause extend the investor’s options? The Supreme Court’s answer turned on the particular language of the treaties, not on a presumption that MFN clauses always or never extend to dispute settlement.
The Court’s Reasoning: Treaty Wording Matters and the Scope of the MFN Clause
The Court’s reasoning is rooted in the customary rules of treaty interpretation reflected in Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (“VCLT”). The starting point is the ordinary meaning of the treaty’s terms, read in context and in light of its object and purpose. In this case, the wording of Article 3(3) of the UK-Georgia BIT proved particularly important because it extends the relevant MFN treatment to Articles 1–11 of the treaty, including Article 8 on dispute settlement.
That express cross-reference distinguishes the case from disputes in which investors have sought to extend an MFN clause to procedural matters without comparable textual support. The Court’s approach gives effect to the parties’ drafting choices: where the treaty expressly brings the dispute settlement provision within the scope of MFN treatment, the argument that the clause is confined to substantive investment protection becomes considerably harder to sustain.
The principle of ejusdem generis, under which MFN treatment generally extends only to matters falling within the scope of the relevant treaty obligation, did not prevent the investor from relying on the Georgia-BLEU BIT. Both treaties concerned investment protection and investor-state dispute settlement. Nor did the reference to ICSID in the UK-Georgia BIT, by itself, exclude the possibility that the MFN clause could operate in relation to another arbitral forum.
The wider lesson is one of interpretative discipline. The judgment does not eliminate the distinction between substantive and procedural treaty obligations. Rather, it demonstrates that the distinction cannot be resolved in the abstract, independently of the language chosen by the contracting states. An MFN clause that expressly encompasses dispute settlement presents a materially different interpretative question from one that is silent on the matter or expressly excludes it.
Interaction Between Treaties and Consent to Arbitration
The more consequential aspect of the ruling concerns state consent. Investment arbitration cannot proceed without consent, but the judgment illustrates that consent need not invariably be expressed in a single provision naming one arbitral institution. Depending on the treaty language, it may emerge from the combined operation of an MFN clause and a dispute settlement provision in a comparator treaty.
The Supreme Court’s reasoning in Okuashvili v. Georgia illustrates that state consent to investment arbitration need not be expressed in a single, forum-specific provision. The Court inferred Georgia’s consent to SCC arbitration from the combined operation of the broadly worded MFN clause in the UK-Georgia BIT and the dispute-settlement mechanism in the Georgia-BLEU BIT. The critical question was therefore not whether Georgia subsequently opposed SCC jurisdiction, but whether its treaty commitments, interpreted as a whole, established unequivocal consent to that forum.
In particular, the Court mentions:
“Since there are no restrictions on how a state may give its consent to arbitration, it must, in principle, be possible for a state to give its consent to a particular type of arbitration through an MFN clause in combination with a dispute-resolution provision in a comparator treaty. If consent constructed in this way, when the treaty provisions are interpreted, appears unequivocal, it cannot additionally be required that the basic treaty contain a general consent to arbitration.” (para. 28)
This reasoning is important. Georgia had agreed to ICSID arbitration under the UK-Georgia BIT, but the Court concluded that the treaty framework could also support SCC jurisdiction through the operation of the MFN clause and the Georgia-BLEU BIT.
The corresponding concern is equally clear. States negotiating investment treaties may intend to offer access to a particular arbitral institution while overlooking the implications of a broadly drafted MFN clause. The judgment reinforces the need for treaty drafters to address expressly whether MFN treatment extends to dispute settlement and, if so, to what extent.
What Constitutes More Favourable Treatment?
The existence of an applicable MFN clause does not, on its own, establish that an investor is entitled to the alternative mechanism. The investor must also demonstrate that the treatment relied upon is more favourable. The Supreme Court approached this comparison holistically, focusing on the dispute settlement mechanisms as a whole rather than isolating individual procedural advantages.
The distinction is important. The UK-Georgia BIT identifies ICSID as the relevant forum, whereas the Georgia-BLEU BIT offers a choice among several institutions, including the SCC. Although the comparator treaty imposes its own procedural requirements, the broader choice of arbitral forums was regarded as a material advantage in the circumstances of the dispute.
A purely selective approach would create obvious difficulties. If investors could extract individual advantages from several treaties without considering the mechanisms to which those advantages belong, MFN clauses could become instruments for constructing a procedural regime that no contracting state had agreed to as a whole. An objective comparison of the complete mechanisms provides a measure of discipline.
The Court’s approach therefore offers a workable middle ground. It does not automatically privilege the dispute settlement provision of the basic treaty, but neither does it permit an investor to assemble a bespoke arbitration procedure from a collection of favourable provisions. The inquiry remains treaty-specific and requires a genuine comparison of the available mechanisms.
A Gateway with Conditions: The Procedural Requirements
The Supreme Court did not grant the investor an unconditional right to proceed with SCC arbitration. It held that the relevant requirements of the comparator treaty also had to be considered.
Article 10 of the Georgia-BLEU BIT contains requirements concerning written notification of the dispute and a period for amicable settlement. The arbitral tribunal had considered the notification requirement satisfied and the waiting period unnecessary because an amicable settlement appeared futile. The Svea Court of Appeal had not examined those matters.
The Supreme Court consequently remitted the case for further consideration of whether the applicable requirements had been fulfilled or otherwise affected jurisdiction.
This qualification is central to the judgment. Paragraph 35 indicates that where an investor relies on a more favourable dispute settlement mechanism through an MFN clause, the mechanism must be considered as a whole. The investor cannot invoke the advantageous forum options while disregarding the conditions attached to them.
In my assessment, this is an important limit on the potentially expansive operation of MFN clauses. The judgment does not permit investors to construct a bespoke dispute settlement procedure by selecting favourable provisions from different treaties. Instead, it requires the alternative mechanism to be applied consistently with its accompanying conditions.
The remittal also means that the decision should not be portrayed as finally resolving every jurisdictional question in the dispute. Its importance lies in the legal basis it recognises for access to the alternative forum, subject to the remaining requirements.
The Swedish Supreme Court’s Approach to MFN-Based Jurisdiction
Georgia opposed the investor’s reliance on the MFN clause and challenged the tribunal’s jurisdiction. The Supreme Court judgment provides the primary source for the parties’ legal arguments and the Court’s response.
The underlying legal debate is longstanding. In Maffezini v. Spain, an ICSID tribunal accepted that an MFN clause could, in the circumstances of that case, extend to dispute settlement. Conversely, in Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal stressed that an MFN clause should not be presumed to extend to dispute settlement without sufficient evidence of the contracting states’ intention.
The Swedish Supreme Court’s approach is notable as it places particular emphasis on the wording of the UK-Georgia BIT. Rather than establishing a universal rule, it relies on the express extension of MFN treatment to Articles 1–11, including the dispute settlement provision.
In its judgment of 26 June 2026, the Swedish Supreme Court set aside the Svea Court of Appeal’s decision and held that Article 3 of the UK-Georgia BIT, read together with Article 10 of the Georgia-BLEU BIT, provided a basis for the SCC tribunal to hear the dispute. However, the Court did not finally resolve the tribunal’s jurisdiction. It remitted the case to the Svea Court of Appeal to determine whether the procedural requirements under Article 10, including the notification and six-month settlement period, precluded jurisdiction. The ruling therefore recognised the legal basis for access to SCC arbitration while leaving the final jurisdictional outcome subject to further examination.
The decision thus offers a useful counterpoint to more restrictive interpretations. It indicates that a treaty’s designation of a particular arbitral institution does not necessarily defeat an MFN argument where the treaty expressly extends MFN treatment to dispute settlement.
For practitioners, the implications are concrete. The analysis must begin with the precise language of the MFN clause, proceed to the scope of the comparator treaty’s dispute settlement provision, and assess whether the alternative mechanism is more favourable when considered as a whole. The procedural conditions attached to that mechanism must then be addressed. Each step matters; none can be replaced by the mere presence of an MFN clause.
Conclusion
The Swedish Supreme Court’s decision in Z.O. v. Georgia is a significant contribution to the debate over MFN clauses in investment arbitration. It confirms that, where the treaty language supports such an interpretation, MFN treatment may extend to dispute settlement and may contribute to establishing consent to arbitration before a forum not expressly designated in the underlying treaty.
The judgment should not be read as a general licence for investors to rewrite dispute settlement provisions through MFN clauses. Rather, it demonstrates how the interaction of treaty provisions may produce jurisdictional consequences that depend on careful textual interpretation.
Ultimately, the decision sends a clear message to treaty drafters and arbitration practitioners alike: an MFN clause may open the door to an alternative arbitral forum, but the wording of the treaty determines whether that door exists, and the conditions of the alternative mechanism determine whether the investor can pass through it.




