THE AUTHOR:
Daniel Greineder, Of Counsel at Kalbian & Hagerty
In its decision in DWL v. DWM [2026] SGHC 179, the Singapore High Court decided an application to set aside an arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitral tribunal had allegedly decided a case on the basis of arguments that the parties had not raised nor had an opportunity to address. The decision provides a forthright statement of a tribunal’s obligation to review the entire file and the limited circumstances when it should invite further submissions.
Should an arbitral award be set aside because the tribunal has undertaken its own comprehensive review of the main contract? Surely, a tribunal’s failure to do so would be a better reason to set aside an award. After all, it is a basic rule of contract interpretation that a contract should be construed as a whole. Moreover, if an arbitral tribunal does not even read the whole contract, what hope is there that it will read the expert evidence? In the decision of the Singapore High Court in DWL v. DWM [2026] SGHC 179, DWL (“the Claimant”), the claimant in the court proceedings and respondent and counterclaimant to the arbitration, applied unsuccessfully to have the arbitral award of the Singapore-seated arbitral tribunal set aside. The Claimant argued that the arbitral tribunal had deviated from the parties’ contractual arguments in reaching its conclusions and developed arguments that it had not put to the parties. That independence allegedly amounted variously to an excess of jurisdiction and breach of natural justice.
Background
Under the parties’ agreement (“the Contract”), the Claimant undertook to supply technical equipment to DWM (“the Respondent”). In doing so, the Claimant faced the difficulty that entities of the Respondent’s nationality were subject to sanctions and an expansion of those sanctions was likely. Press reports suggest that the case originated in the energy sector and the Respondent is Russian. However, the application does not turn on this. The Contract included a detailed protocol at Article 27B regulating the parties’ response to sanctions. This included that the Claimant as supplier would try to obtain special licences for parts or adjust the designs to ensure the equipment fell outside the scope of any sanctions. In the arbitration, it was in issue whether those obligations were alternative or, as the majority of the tribunal held, cumulative.
The parties ran into difficulty after the progressive imposition of far-reaching international sanctions from the spring of 2022. Despite its efforts to mitigate the impact of the sanctions, the Claimant felt it could no longer perform the Contract and filed a Notice of Suspension with effect from 1 June 2022. The Respondent disputed the validity of the suspension notice, alleging it was premature. On 15 July 2022, the Respondent issued a Notice of Termination on the grounds that the Claimant’s continued suspension amounted to a material breach of the Contract. On 4 August 2022, the Claimant for its part disputed the validity of the termination notice, also alleging non-payment by the Respondent. On 25 August 2022, the Claimant issued its own notice of termination.
In the arbitration, which the Respondent initiated, the tribunal decided the fallout from the parties’ rival notices of termination, including the Respondent’s claim on a performance bond. Broadly, the Respondent prevailed, with the majority of the tribunal finding the Respondent to have validly terminated the Contract.
Challenge to the Award
The Claimant challenged the award on five grounds. It alleged that the tribunal had acted in excess of its jurisdiction or, in the alternative, breached the fair hearing rule by construing Article 27B as an ongoing obligation that endured beyond suspension, by particular reference to Articles 45.6 and 54. Yet neither party had referred to those provisions nor was invited to make submissions (Ground 1). Further, the tribunal had construed as conjunctive the Claimant’s two Article 27B obligations, namely, to mitigate the effect of sanctions by obtaining suitable permits and adapting designs. On the Claimant’s case, this again was an excess of jurisdiction and a breach of the fair hearing rule, because the parties had both construed those obligations as alternative courses of action (Ground 2). The Claimant also argued that the Tribunal’s alleged reliance on post-termination conduct as a measure of the validity of the termination was incoherently reasoned and, as such, a breach of natural justice (Ground 3). Ground 4 goes to the cumulative effect of those breaches and is a matter of pleading rather than substance. The fifth and final ground goes to the redundancy of the Tribunal’s findings in relation to the performance bond that the Respondent called.
The Claimant failed on all these grounds. The detailed reasoning of Philip Jeyaretnam J is of limited general interest as it turns on the minutiae of the wording of the Contract and the award. The arguments are essentially contractual. In the absence of a conventional appeals process, the Claimant, like other applicants to setting-aside proceedings, resorted to casting substantive arguments on the merits as procedural or jurisdictional defects. The arguments do not appear especially strong. Nor does the award come across as a model of lucid drafting. Nonetheless, the judge needed some 80 pages to evaluate the arguments. This is a measure of the complexities that arise where a party digs its heels in and argues over tiny details. The Singapore courts wisely recommend good sense in interpreting awards. The Court of Appeal in BLC v. BLB [2014] 4 SLR 79 held at [86], warned against carrying out “a hypercritical or excessively syntactical analysis” of challenged awards.
The legal standards applied by the judge are valuable not only in themselves but also as a guideline to arbitrators who may depart from the precise positions of the parties. Quoting from the jurisprudence of the Singapore courts, the judge summarizes the scope of the parties’ submissions as follows, at [51]:
“[I]n considering whether the jurisdiction has been exceeded, the court must look at matters in the round to determine whether the issues in question were live issues in the arbitration. In doing so, it does not apply an unduly narrow view of what the issues were: rather, it is to have regard to the totality of what was presented to the tribunal whether by way of evidence, submissions, pleadings or otherwise and consider whether, in the light of all that, these points were live.”
The submission to an arbitral tribunal arises out of the totality of the parties’ submissions and exhibits. Once a matter is raised, for example, in evidence, a party’s closely circumscribed line of argument cannot prevent an arbitrator from considering it. Indeed, Singapore law places a positive obligation – “must look at matters” – on arbitrators to consider the evidence in light of the live issues before them. Put crudely, you cannot submit a contract and ask an arbitrator to ignore half of it. In this case, a whole contract was before the tribunal.
Not only is the scope of an arbitrator’s jurisdiction construed widely, but arbitrators are also afforded broad discretion in evaluating the evidence for themselves. The judge cites further case law at [61]:
“These arbitrators cannot be so straightjacketed as to be permitted to only adopt in their conclusions the premises put forward by the parties. If an unargued premise flows reasonably from an argued premise, I do not think that it is necessarily incumbent on the arbitral tribunal to invite the parties to submit new arguments. The arbitral tribunal would be doing nothing more than inferring a related premise from one that has been placed before it.”
Accordingly, the circumstances in which arbitrators’ independent analysis will compromise a party’s right to a fair hearing will be limited. At [63], the judge explains: “Put another way, a tribunal will only be found to have denied a party a reasonable opportunity to present its case if it adopts a chain of reasoning which dramatically departs from and bears no nexus to parties’ submissions.”
Philip Jeyaretnam J goes on to hold that the Tribunal’s approach to contractual analysis was foreseeable. As discussed here, the scope of submission to arbitration bears on counsel’s duties as well as those of a tribunal. Counsel must use his opportunity to present his case to furnish the tribunal with the most relevant materials to reach a decision. In doing so, he must foresee as best possible the tools that an arbitrator will need to write a well-reasoned award. Although it may be good practice to invite supplementary submissions, counsel cannot count on being automatically asked to do so.
Discussion
The decision of the Singapore High Court in DWL v. DWM is to be welcomed as a clear summary of the duties of both arbitrators and counsel in presenting and evaluating evidence. While it is specifically a statement of Singapore law, it deserves to serve as a model of good international practice. Arbitrators cannot reasonably be held too narrowly to parties’ lines of argument. Where evidence is genuinely complex or a contractual provision admits of several interpretations, it is only to be expected that there will be more possible assessments than the competing positions of the parties. Moreover, parties tend to present their positions in categorical terms, for example, playing down exceptions to the application of a contractual provision or calling into doubt the entirety of a witness’s evidence rather than only part of it. It is unlikely that a balanced decision can simply adopt such lines of argument.
Determining the precise scope of an arbitrator’s remit is not easy. The Singapore courts have used terms such as considering issues “in the round” or resorted to the legal standard of foreseeability, which can be very artificial, especially after the event. The difficulty in expressing precise standards may be the result not only of the peculiar circumstances of different cases but also of the conventions of arbitral drafting. Parties are not usually held to a tight pleading or detailed list of issues. Key evidence may be written and play no great part in a hearing, while other important arguments, such as on quantum, appear only in expert reports. It is difficult for a court exercising curial oversight to be more precise than saying that all the evidence counts, subject to cautious warnings against tribunal whimsy.
Finally, the decision reinforces the need for parties to choose arbitrators who will respond well to their particular style of presenting a case. There should be an intellectual bond between arbitrator and counsel. For example, an arbitrator used to strict English court pleadings will not take kindly to discursive memorials. That will help to ensure that the parties can reasonably anticipate the arbitrators’ approach and furnish them with the best arguments and evidence, thus avoiding nasty surprises.




