B v C [2024] QIC (F) 20
THE AUTHOR:
Umar Azmeh, Registrar at the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre
B v C [2024] QIC (F) 20
5 May 2024: Qatar Financial Centre Civil and Commercial Court
Coram: Justices Ali Malek KC, Dr Muna Al-Marzouqi and Dr Georges Affaki
Background
The jurisdiction of the Qatar Financial Centre Civil and Commercial Court (the ‘QFC Court’ or the ‘Court’), a part of the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre (‘QICDRC’), is tightly defined by its governing statute, the Qatar Financial Centre Law (Law No. 7 of 2005), and the Free Zones Law (Law No. 34 of 2005). Broadly speaking, there must be a connection to the QFC, such as a party being a company registered at the QFC or the Qatar Free Zones (‘QFZ’), to establish the QFC Court’s jurisdiction. This can include litigation between two registered companies, a registered company and a non-registered company, as well as cases involving QFC or QFZ company employees or former employees and their respective employers. In this way, the jurisdiction of the QFC Court is an opt-out one, in contradistinction, for example, to the DIFC Court.
One caveat to this rule is the QFC Court’s role as a competent/supervisory court in relation to arbitration matters. Under the national arbitration law – the Law Promulgating the Civil and Commercial Arbitration Law (Law No. 2 of 2017) – the Competent Court is defined as:
“The Civil and Commercial Arbitral Disputes Circuit in the Court of Appeals or the First Instance Circuit of the Civil and Commercial Court of the Qatar Financial Centre pursuant to the agreement of the Parties.“
The QFC Court has already heard a case clarifying how the Competent Court may be chosen, emphasizing that parties must explicitly designate the QFC Court as such (A v B [2023] QIC (F) 16). Thus, for any arbitration seated in Qatar, parties may choose the QFC Court as the Competent Court.
The Present Case: B v C [2024] QIC (F) 20
The parties were business partners engaged in a joint venture to obtain construction contracts in Qatar (road construction projects). The shareholders’ agreement in relation to the joint venture became the subject of dispute which subsequently went to arbitration administered by the International Chamber of Commerce. The seat of the arbitration was the QFC and the substantive law of the arbitration was Qatari law.
The Applicant sought an order setting aside the arbitral award on various grounds, the substance of which were: (i) the Tribunal failed to give effect to mandatory provisions of Qatari law which meant that the award was not in the “interest of the QFC” and was contrary to the public order of the QFC and/or the State of Qatar, (ii) the Tribunal did not give adequate reasons or any reasons for preferring the evidence of the Respondent’s primary witness over that of the Applicant and the arbitral procedure was not carried out in accordance with the parties’ agreement, and (iii) the fact that the Tribunal awarded the Respondent interest as part of the award was contrary to Qatari law and was therefore not in the interest of the QFC.
The Court’s Interpretation of the QFC Arbitration Regulations 2005
As noted, the seat of the arbitration was the QFC, and article 41 of the QFC Arbitration Regulations 2005 (‘Regulations’) sets out the grounds upon which a party may seek an order to set aside an award. This includes a ground of challenge that an award is “not in the interest of the QFC” (article 41(2)(B)(ii)).
The Court noted that article 41 was modelled on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (the ‘Model Law’) and that this should be taken into account when interpreting that article (paragraph 49). The phrase that is used in the Model Law is “public policy” (article 34) and the Court concluded that there was no reason to make a distinction between “interest” and “public policy”, and that any difference in article 41 was likely the result of a drafting error. The Court was also of the view that, whilst the Regulations make a distinction between the QFC and Qatar, this is a “distinction that does not have any practical effect because it is difficult to think of a case where the interest of the QFC and that of the State of Qatar are not aligned or the same” (paragraph 66).
The QFC Court’s Approach to Set Aside Applications
The Court’s view on the public policy exception is worth setting out in full (paragraph 70):
“… the fact that the public policy exception is to be narrowly construed. This is because the policies underlining enforcement of awards is that of finality and pro-enforcement. The users of international arbitration value these policies. They also value certainty and the knowledge that challenges to awards are on narrow grounds and exceptional. This means that challenges will be rare and when made must be carefully scrutinised against the strictest standards. The fact that the chosen jurisdiction of the parties made a mistake of law or of fact is not a ground of challenge. Public policy is not infringed if a tribunal incorrectly applied the law to the facts.“
The Court also made it clear that when it comes to a discretionary decision of a tribunal, the Court will not “review or second guess procedural decisions by the tribunal” as it (the tribunal) will have “considerable discretion as to how it conducts proceedings” (paragraph 73). Furthermore, where the Court has discretion, it will only interfere if “serious prejudice is shown by the party seeking to challenge the award”, consistent with a policy of “minimal curial intervention” (paragraph 74).
The Decision
The Court refused the application on all of the grounds. It ruled, inter alia, as follows:
- The contention that the Tribunal was wrong on the law and the facts is not a valid ground of challenge under the Regulations; that challenge does not fall within the “public interest” provision of the Regulations; and the contention that the Tribunal went behind mandatory provisions of Qatari law was not borne out, relying on a decision of the Qatari Court of Cassation (Appeal No. 512 of 2020).
- When it comes to the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and other evidence – indeed, article 41 of the Regulations is not engaged in any event – this is a matter for the Tribunal. The Court does “not interfere with findings of fact and assessment of the evidence by a tribunal” (paragraph 101): this is a well-established policy in international arbitration, and in any event, a “deficiency in reasons is not a ground for challenging a decision” (paragraph 106). There was also nothing to suggest that the arbitration was carried out otherwise than in accordance with the parties’ agreement.
- There are many decisions from the QFC Court that make it clear that interest can be awarded. Moreover, there are a number of decisions of the other national Courts of the State of Qatar, including the Court of Cassation that make it clear that interest can be awarded. Finally, there are a number of statutes that also envisage the awarding of interest.
Conclusion
This judgment has made the QFC Court’s approach to set aside applications very clear: minimal curial intervention, emphasizing that the Court does not sit on appeal from decisions. This will give international arbitration lawyers and business significant comfort that the Court adopts a pro-arbitration and enforcement process. Moreover, the case was heard very promptly with the judgment issued shortly after the hearing, further enhancing the Court’s reputation for efficiency and reliability.
The Court’s judgment can be found in both English and Arabic, here: CTFIC0075/2023 | QICDRC
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Umar Azmeh was appointed Registrar in October 2022, and oversees the management of cases before the Qatar International Court and Dispute Resolution Centre. He is also a member of the senior management team and the Judicial Advisory Board.
He qualified both as a barrister and a solicitor, and practised as a barrister, gaining experience in criminal and civil law, latterly conducting civil litigation on behalf of various United Kingdom government departments. He qualified as a solicitor at Hogan Lovells in 2017, where he gained experience in commercial law, including high-value commercial litigation. He subsequently worked at the Court of Appeal of England and Wales (Criminal Division) which entailed advising the senior judiciary on some of the most serious and significant cases in the jurisdiction.
He is currently a DPhil in Law Candidate at the University of Oxford (St Anne’s College. He is also a Visiting Lecturer at The City Law Schools (City, University of London).
*The views and opinions expressed by authors are theirs and do not necessarily reflect those of their organizations, employers, or Daily Jus, Jus Mundi, or Jus Connect.